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This study analyses the 2004 Eastern Enlargement to the European Union to
obtain evidence on the employment effects of an increase in trade liberalisation. The
Enlargement is thought to generate a trade-induced demand shock with no (or only
limited) supply effects. Besides the variation over time induced by the Enlargement,
identification of the effects is based on a Melitz (2003) type productivity term to
differentiate firms by the extent of exposure to the demand shock. The idea is that the
effects of the demand shock should be driven by differences in firm-level productivity
from the period before the new member countries actually entered the EU. German
linked employer-employee data allow to observe the relation of initial establishment
productivity with employment changes over a long panel from 1995 to 2009. The
estimates show that the Enlargement had a negative effect on establishment-level
employment growth, which is driven by increased worker separations and increased
job destruction. Besides the overall employment effect, the study focuses on effect
heterogeneity across age and skill groups of the workforce. These estimates point to a
skill bias in the effect of the Enlargement that disadvantages low- and medium-skilled
workers in terms of higher worker separation and job destruction. In addition, low-
skilled workers suffer fewer accessions by firms, where against medium-skilled workers
enjoy increased accessions and creation of new jobs. Besides this indication for a skill
bias, there are no clear indications that point to an age bias in the employment effect
of the Eastern Enlargement.
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1 Introduction
Globalisation steadily pushes international trade: Goods, services, information and capital
move to where they generate the highest return, thereby accelerating dynamics on product
and labour markets. In Europe, the progress of the European Union (EU) decisively
drives market integration across its member countries. While national product markets
interweave increasingly, labour markets are more segmented. But integration of product
markets can generate shocks to labour markets, increasing the demand for a flexible labour
force. In this study, I analyse the employment effects of a trade-induced demand shock
that has been raised by the 2004 Eastern Enlargement to the EU.
The employment consequences of trade liberalisation are discussed controversially. Lib-
eralisation is said to generate overall welfare gains when firms conquer new export markets.
Wage inequality increases, but the effect on unemployment can theoretically go in either
direction (Egger and Kreickemeier, 2009; Helpman et al., 2010). Consequences for em-
ployment seem to depend on the structure of employers and regions. In export-oriented
regions, employment increases, where it decreases in regions that experience import pres-
sure (Autor et al., 2013a,c; Dauth et al., 2014). Trade opening can also hurt particular
groups or have an undesirable distribution (Slaughter, 1998). When skill and demographic
groups are imperfect substitutes in the production process, relative demand shifts between
these groups alter employment and wages (Katz and Autor, 1999).
A trade-induced demand shock is likely to shift the relative demand for skills. The
classical argument is that trade liberalisation leads to a specialisation in high skills in
a country that has a relative abundance of high-skilled workers, so that the demand for
low-skilled workers decreases. Recent studies analyse several channels through which low-
skilled workers may be affected. First, trade integration shifts production towards more
productive firms, of which the most productive export (Melitz, 2003). These firms may
produce higher-quality goods, requiring higher-skilled workers, and decreasing demand for
lower-skilled workers (Verhoogen, 2008). In this process of skill upgrading, more product-
ive workers select themselves into exporting firms. A second explanation is offshoring of
low-skilled jobs to countries with abundance of low-skilled workers (Feenstra and Hanson,
1996). Domestic jobs for low-skilled workers are destroyed, and relative demand goes up
for higher-skilled workers. Third, trade can trigger technology upgrading or skill-biased
technological change, where the productivity of skilled workers increases through better
technology (Bustos, 2011). The adoption of better technology can displace low-skilled jobs
and shift relative skill demand upwards.
Technological and organisational change is suspected to be age-biased as well (Aubert
et al., 2006; Beckmann, 2007). Demographic change and an ageing workforce are likely
to intensify the effects of trade liberalisation. Older workers are a specific group on the
labour market, as they face a decision between employment and retirement. They are
slower in adapting to new requirements and technologies, and are less likely to catch up
with changes on the labour market (Skirbekk, 2008). Empirical studies on age-biased
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technological change denote a discrimination of older over younger workers.
To summarise, the literature indicates that a shock in trade liberalisation has differen-
tial effects on workers in different skill and age groups. A trade-induced demand shock is
likely to favour higher-skilled over lower-skilled workers, and younger over older workers.
To empirically investigate these patterns, I use the 2004 EU Eastern Enlargement as a
source of exogenous variation in trade liberalisation to estimate heterogeneous employment
effects on the establishment level. The impact of the 2004 Enlargement has been the object
of research for a few studies. In an ex-ante study, the Enlargement has been suspected
to have undesirable distributional effects (Boeri and Brücker, 2001). The ex-post studies
by Braakmann and Vogel (2010, 2011) and Brülhart et al. (2012) analyse the effect of the
Enlargement on employment and wages in Germany and Austria, respectively. Similar
to my analysis, the studies are based on a treatment intensity term to approximate how
strong firms and workers are affected by the market integration. But as a measure for the
treatment intensity, they use the distance between the region and the border to Poland or
the Czech Republic as treatment intensity. Their argument is that firms are affected more
strongly the closer they are to the opening market. This seems to be relevant for service
firms that operate close to the opening border and profit from an increased customer mar-
ket. Though, the argumentation that more distance goes along with higher transportation
costs for manufactured goods is not completely convincing. While a large part of world
trade is operated between neighbour countries, the marginal transport costs of distance
are in decline (Hummels, 2007). It is unlikely that the transportation of a specific good
on a lorry or a train is much more costly for a Swabian manufacturer over a distance of
350 kilometres than for a firm located in Nuremberg over a distance of 150 kilometres.
Therefore, I refrain from using a distance measure and rely on a Melitz-type productiv-
ity term to differentiate manufacturing firms by how strong they are affected. The idea is
that the effects of the demand shock induced by the Enlargement should be driven by dif-
ferences in productivity of German firms before the new member countries actually entered
the EU. For this study, I rely on German linked employer-employee data, which enable me
to analyse initial establishment productivity. The employee data give precise information
on employment outcomes, like worker flows and job flows. Based on this framework, I
estimate the effect of the Enlargement on employment growth within establishments, and
analyse the heterogeneity over age and skill groups. I find that employment growth drops
in reaction to the Enlargement, and this effect seems to be channelled by increased worker
separation and increased job destruction. Furthermore, the estimates suggest the effect of
trade liberalisation on employment is skill-biased, as low- and medium-skilled workers ex-
perience increased worker separation and job destruction as compared to the high-skilled.
Besides the indication for a skill bias, the results do not suggest the presence of an age
bias that is directed against older workers.
This study is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the increase in trade liberal-
isation by the European Union Eastern Enlargement and argues how this change creates
quasi-experimental variation that is used by my estimation approach. Section 3 guides
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through the literature and derives hypotheses. The data base and descriptive facts are ex-
plained in Section 4. Section 5 presents the empirical model, which is applied to estimate
the effect of trade liberalisation on employment changes in Section 5.1, and to estimate
heterogeneous effects over age and skill groups in Section 5.2. Section 6 discusses the
empirical results and concludes.
2 The 2004 EU Eastern Enlargement
Focusing on Europe, globalisation and trade liberalisation find an expression in the European
Union. The EU is on a course of accession which will not come to a halt in the near fu-
ture. Among recent enlargements, the Eastern Enlargement on 1st May 2004 is the largest,
when ten new member countries joined simultaneously. On that day, the population of
the EU grew from 380 to more than 450 million, and GDP increased by 5 per cent. In
the following years from 2004 to 2008, GDP of the new members grew by 23 per cent –
compared to 8 per cent for the old EU members.
Preceding the accession, the EU already held treaties with all these new member
countries. In 1991, the EU started an association process with the Central and Eastern
European Countries (CEEC) to economically connect those countries by creating a free-
trade area and preparing their potential accession. During the following years until the
actual accession of the new member countries, several achievements were made to har-
monise trade and economic development. In the exemplary case of Poland, the European
Commission stated in July 1997 that certain judicial and free-trade rules were implemen-
ted, but that more effort is needed to catch up with the requirements. Several reports
by the Commission document progress and regress in the implementation of the common
market. So in a process that took more than 12 years, Poland slowly completed the trans-
ition to the common market and tariff union of the EU. Within that time span, tariffs and
quantity restrictions on imports and exports were completely abolished, but stepwise for
different product groups and industrial sectors. The accession of Poland and the 9 other
countries was recommended by the European Commission only on 9th October 2002, and
the actual decision was made on 13th December 2002. In the course of the year 2003,
the accession treaties were ratified by the 10 new member countries. The accession treaty
with Poland was finally signed on 16th April 2003.
On the actual date of the Enlargement on 1st May 2004, technical barriers to trade
were harmonised and all customs control procedures between the EU and the new member
countries were eliminated. Not before this date, every citizen could cross the borders and
every firm could trade goods without any customs control procedures and without waiting
time. Moreover, these countries were now part of the EU, and harmonisation of standards,
subsidies, regulation and national legal frameworks from then on were administered on the
supranational level.
Germany had a specific position in the accession of the CEEC. About 50 per cent
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of imports to the new member countries is produced in Germany.1 The Enlargement
constituted a shock to German product markets by the elimination of borders between
partially integrated countries. The treatment in my analysis is the actual opening of the
borders, which facilitated direct trade between producers and customers Germany and the
new member countries.
In contrast, labour markets were not liberalised at the same time. Free movement of
labour for 7 out of the 10 new member countries, namely the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and Slowakia, to Germany was delayed 7 years after
the accession date. This to some extent excludes supply effects in terms of labour move-
ment from the new member states to occur simultaneously with the liberalisation of trade
flows.
The actual accession of these countries caused a significant rise in product-specific
trade. The analysis by Hornok (2010) shows that the 2004 accession increased bilateral
exports of manufactured products in country relations of a former member country with
at least one new member country by 15 per cent. Besides rising export opportunities
for firms in the pre-Enlargement EU, there is evidence for increased import competition
from newly accessed member countries. Consequently, recent studies document increases
in German imports and exports (e.g. Baas and Brücker, 2011). There are considerable
differences over regions that are either directed towards international exports or towards
the reception of product imports (Dauth et al., 2014). Overall, Baas and Brücker (2011)
show that the increase in German exports to the new member countries has been larger
than the increase in imports.
Figure 1 depicts aggregated trade flows between Germany and 7 Central and Eastern
European Countries (CEE7) that accessed the European Union by 2004: the Czech Re-
public, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and Slowakia. These new member
countries are relevant trade partners for the old member countries of the EU. The figure
shows that the import flow from these CEE7 increases with the same trend before and
after the date of the Enlargement. Export flows into these countries, in contrast, push
to a steeper trend one year after the Enlargement. The break in exports in 2009 is likely
to represent the Great Recession, which hit incoming orders of German firms strongest in
that specific year.
To gain deeper insights into industry-specific trade patterns, Figure 2 contains trade
balance charts for 2-digit manufacturing industries between Germany and the CEE7.
Trade balances are defined as exports minus imports. There is a strong increase in the
trade balance in the food sector after 2007 that exceeds the level in the 1990’s. The
tobacco industry has evenly balanced imports and exports, and continues on this trend
after the Enlargement. In the clothing industry, clothing trade balance is on an increasing
trend, which already started before the Enlargement in 2000. Leather trade and drapery
1The Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia imported goods
amounting to 83.5 billion Euro in 2001 (source: Eurostat Comext), while Germany exported 52 billion
Euro to these countries (source: Statistisches Bundesamt).
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Figure 1: Trade flows between Europe and CEE7 countries
Note: In million Euro; all numbers deflated by export and import price indices, respectively.
Source: Comext EU27 Trade Data, Eurostat.
trade, in contrast, unaffectedly remain with their levels. The wood and the paper industry
exhibit increasing trade balances from 2003 on, that is one year prior to the Enlargement.
The printing industry trade balance is not touched by this trend and slightly decreases. In
the chemical industry, there are clear upward trends for coking and petroleum processing
starting in 2004. For chemical products, the upward trend already started in 1995, but
accelerates after 2005. Metal working and metal production have been on upward trends
before the Enlargement as well, and even increase after 2004. In the engineering sector,
mechanical engineering peaks after the Enlargement, and returns to its prior level in 2009.
The same pattern is true for office machinery. Other mechanical industries—electricity
generating machines, broadcasting and communication engineering, medical and measure-
ment technology—do not show trade balance changes associated with the Enlargement. In
the automotive sector, the trade balance decreases strongly between 2001 and 2003, and
peaks in the following years. In 2009, it reverses to its former trend. These figures indicate
strong heterogeneity in the reactions of trade flows to the Enlargement over industries,
and suggest that different firms react differently to the potential of the increased market.
This paragraph explains the age and skill mix in Germany and the CEEC. Statistics
on the age and skill endowment of workforces in Germany and in the CEEC are shown in
Figures 7 and 8 in the Appendix. The age mix of the workforces in the CEEC is similar to
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Figure 2: Trade balance between Germany and CEE7 countries in 2-digit manufacturing
industries
Note: In million Euro; all numbers deflated by export and import price indices, respectively.
Source: Comext EU27 Trade Data, Eurostat.
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that in Germany. The share of older workers (50 to 64) is between 19 per cent (Poland)
and 26 per cent (Czech Republic), with Germany at the upper end with 25 per cent.
Prime-age workers (25 to 49) represent 63 (Latvia) to 70 per cent (Slovenia) of workers
in the CEEC, and 63 per cent in Germany. The share of young workers is between 8 and
13 per cent in the CEEC, and 12 per cent in Germany. Similar to Germany, the CEEC
exhibit stagnation in fertility and shrinking populations, combined with increasing life
expectancy (Stanowsky, 2007). These numbers indicate only small relative abundances of
age groups between Germany and the CEEC.
The skill mix of the workforce in the CEEC is more heterogeneous.2 The share of
low-skilled workers in the CEEC ranges between 7 (Czech Republic) and 15 per cent
(Hungary, Slovenia), with a clear gap to Germany at 18 per cent. However, Germany
has a relatively low share of medium-skilled workers of 58 per cent compared to the
CEEC, who all have higher shares except Estonia. Concerning the share of high-skilled
workers, Germany has 24 per cent, where the CEEC range between 14 (Czech Republic)
and 30 per cent (Lithuania). The Baltic States have a clear relative abundance of high-
skilled workers, where other CEEC like the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia have
an abundance of medium-skilled workers. Germany itself has a high share of low-skilled
workers. As Germany has a relative abundance of low-skilled workers, offshoring low-
skilled jobs does not seem rewarding according to the theory. But almost all CEEC have
a relative abundance of medium-skilled workers compared to Germany, so that relocating
medium-skilled jobs from Germany to the CEEC seems reasonable.
Since the mid-1990’s, the German manufacturing industry has strongly increased in
productivity. Indications for an increase in productivity are decreased unit labour costs
and increased real wages in the manufacturing industry, as argued by Dustmann et al.
(2014). They state that the productivity of German manufacturing strongly profited from
trade opening with the CEEC, much more so than other European countries. Accompanied
by the increase in productivity, the German manufacturing sector was shrinking in terms of
employment.3 Potential effects of the trade opening for the labour market were therefore
widely discussed. Export chances for domestic firms are opposed by increased import
pressure from abroad.
Based on these considerations, I argue that the 2004 Eastern Enlargement created exo-
genous variation in trade liberalisation. The fact that the labour market liberalisation was
delayed by 7 years rules out supply-side effects to a certain extent. This setting enables me
to estimate the effect of the Enlargement on employment outcomes. The following section
discusses the literature and derives hypotheses, and argues how the observed increase in
trade balances can give rise to relative demand shifts over skill and age groups.
2The figures in this paragraph are based on the International Standard Classification of Education
(ISCED). Low-skilled workers have less than primary, primary and lower secondary education (levels 0-2);
medium-skilled workers have upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education (levels 3 and 4);
high-skilled workers have a short-cycle tertiary, bachelor or equivalent, master or equivalent and doctoral
or equivalent (levels 5-8).
3In 1995, 21.6 per cent of all jobs were located in manufacturing, while it was only 17.7 per cent in 2007
(Dustmann et al., 2014).
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3 Theories and hypotheses
Heckscher-Ohlin-type models expect increased trade with relatively low-skill abundant
countries to shift production towards skill-intensive industries in the high-skill abundant
country, whereby the relative employment of high-skilled labour increases, and employment
of low-skilled labour decreases. This may result in wage and employment gaps between skill
groups and contribute to a relative demand shift for labour. Lowering trade barriers with
developing countries, which are relatively low-skill abundant, hits low-skilled workers as
compared to other skill groups, when domestic firms specialise in skill-intensive production
(Wood, 1995).
In recent models, heterogeneous firms within one industry are in competition for pro-
ductivity, which is strongly correlated with export status. Only productive firms can
bear the cost to enter and survive in the export market. An increase in trade opening
induces the most productive firms to increase exports and profits (Melitz, 2003). Less
productive firms are still able to export, but with decreasing profits, while others can no
longer afford to export. The least productive firms leave the market completely. The
Melitz model predicts that trade liberalisation reallocates export market shares towards
the more productive firms.
The empirical literature names different explanations and channels for the relative
demand shift of trade liberalisation. The following sections discuss which factors play a
role in the framework of the Eastern Enlargement. Based on this argumentation, I derive
hypotheses on how the Enlargement is expected to shift skill- and age-specific labour
demand.
3.1 Skill upgrading
Trade liberalisation can improve the cost structure of production, and lead to a process of
quality competition. In this reallocation process, exporting firms differentiate production
of goods with respect to quality, when consumers have a taste-for-quality. To be able
to produce these higher-quality goods, they are in need of qualified labour. This theory
is lined out by Verhoogen (2008), who describes the concept in a nutshell that “worker
quality improves product quality.” As workers’ skills are imperfect substitutes, firms have
to invest in better-qualified workers in order to produce a higher-quality good. In this
way, quality upgrading of exporting firms gives rise to skill upgrading, i.e. that more
productive workers sort themselves into exporting firms which have a higher demand for
skills (Frías et al., 2009). Quality upgrading results in an employment shift from low-
skill- towards high-skill-oriented firms within a specific industry. Empirically, Bloom et al.
(2012) show that employment in Europe has shifted towards higher-skill-oriented firms as
an adaptation to increased import competition with China, while employment in general
decreased. For Germany, Kutschka (2011) finds that quality competition indeed decreases
the relative demand for low-skilled workers, but accounts only for a small share of the
overall decline.
8
Picking up the analysis of trade balance between Germany and the CEE7 from Sec-
tion 2, I assume skill upgrading due to the Enlargement to be prevalent in mechanical
engineering as well as the food and paper industries. The increase in trade balances can
be attributed to the time period after the Enlargement, so that trade liberalisation is
likely to have increased quality competition. Skill upgrading implies a demand shift from
lower- towards higher-skilled workers, and is likely to be present in manufacturing firms.
A firm that conducts quality upgrading is expected to set up jobs for and increase hirings
of high-skilled workers, while separations of low- or medium-skilled workers increase.
3.2 Outsourcing and offshoring
Another explanation for a relative demand shift is outsourcing and offshoring of low-
skilled jobs (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, 1997).4 Outsourcing denotes the process when
the production of intermediate goods is moved abroad, and the intermediate goods are
then imported and assembled to the final product. This can lead to cost savings for the
firms, thereby increasing their productivity, size, and competitiveness. In this process,
the demand for low-skilled workers in the outsourcing firm decreases, and the relative de-
mand for high-skilled workers increases. The CEEC have potential for direct investment
and outsourcing from German manufacturing firms, as these countries have a relatively
many low- and medium-skilled workers, low wages, and historical ties to Germany and
the German language. Furthermore, working regulations are more flexible than in Ger-
many. Geishecker (2004) finds that outsourcing low-skilled jobs has contributed to the shift
from low-skilled towards high-skilled workers in German manufacturing. More specifically,
Geishecker (2006, 2008) shows that German outsourcing to CEEC significantly lowers the
domestic demand for and the employment security of low-skilled workers. He argues that
the magnitude of this effect is comparable to the effect of skill-biased technological change.
Marin (2011) states and empirically demonstrates that German (and Austrian) job losses
for the low-skilled due to outsourcing are small. She argues that offshoring of high-skilled
jobs arises, as the workforce in CEEC is comparably high skilled. This would reverse the
demand shift described by Feenstra and Hanson (1996). Using the estimation approach
by Feenstra and Hanson, she finds an absence of relative wage growth for skilled workers
in Germany, and an increase in relative wages for skilled workers in Poland.
The literature on offshoring implies a decrease in the demand for low-skilled labour in
reaction to the Enlargement, as offshoring predominantly takes place among jobs with low
skill requirements. Given the skill mix in Germany and the CEEC as described in Section
2, offshoring of jobs with medium skill requirements seems even more likely. This should
increase job destruction especially among medium-skilled workers. When firms increase
their profits by these cost savings, new jobs for higher-skilled workers may be created.
4Blinder (2009) calculates that U.S. occupations that are most prone to offshoring are not low-skilled
or low-wage jobs. He states that the correlation between offshorability and education is almost zero.
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3.3 Skill-biased technological change
Other studies point towards the adoption of better technology and declining computer
prices being the reason for the demand shift in skills. Bustos (2011) argues that a tariff
reduction between trade partners increases revenues for exporting firms, which then invest
in new profitable technologies. Based on the framework by Yeaple (2005), this process of
technology-upgrading induces exporting firms to adopt a high-fixed-cost modern techno-
logy, which in turn leads to skill upgrading. A related explanation for within-industry
skill shifts is that trade can trigger skill-biased technological change (Berman et al., 1998;
Autor et al., 2003). The argument is that technological progress within firms favours
higher-skilled over lower-skilled workers, as computerisation reduces the demand for low-
skilled workers, and makes high-skilled workers even more productive. The relevance of
trade-induced technological change is underlined by Bloom et al. (2012) who show that
innovation in firms in twelve European countries increased with the pressure of Chinese
imports. They observe increased IT intensity and productivity of the firms. This is likely
to reflect offshoring of less IT intensive and low productivity parts of the production
chain. In addition to this effect on technological change, they find that the trade increase
is responsible for employment reallocations towards firms with higher skill concentration.
Many firms undergo profound organisational changes in respond to demand shocks.
Typically, hierarchy and organisation are adapted to flatter and more autonomous struc-
tures. Organisational change has implications for workers: possessing more autonomy and
responsibility, they need higher skills to fulfil their tasks. This raises the question whether
organisational change is skill-biased as well, as it is suspected to demand higher-skilled
workers to perform the increased complexity of tasks. Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) em-
pirically analyse the relationship between organisational change and skill-specific labour
demand of French and British establishments. The central finding is that firms that in-
troduce organisational changes exhibit a falling demand for low-skilled workers. Greenan
(2003) and Piva et al. (2005) present evidence that organisational change might be even
more relevant for the skill-specific demand shift than technological change as such.
Technological change is also known to shift task-specific demand. As the task content of
jobs may differ from their skill content, it is likely that technological change is not limited
to shift skill-specific demand. While routine tasks of workers can be subject to substitution
by computers or machines, this is not true for manual tasks (as shown by Autor et al.,
2003 for the U.S., and by Goos and Manning, 2007 for Britain). Demand moves away
from routine tasks towards non-routine manual and non-routine cognitive tasks. Autor
and Dorn (2009) point out an age discrepancy in the displacement of routine tasks: the
increasing demand for non-routine cognitive tasks is almost only filled with young workers,
while the demand for non-routine manual tasks concentrates on older workers. In the
analysis of the relationship between the initial share of routine employment in a region
and the subsequent employment growth in the German service sector, Senftleben and
Wielandt (2012) show that technological change reallocates former routine tasks to non-
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routine manual and non-routine cognitive tasks. Whereas younger workers have better
chances to go into cognitive tasks by human capital investments, older workers are more
likely to end up in manual tasks. The authors find that for older workers, the decline in
routine jobs is accompanied by a similar rise in non-routine manual jobs.
Occupations seem to be the channel through which not only technological change
but also offshoring influences wage and employment inequality (“trade in tasks”, e.g.
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008; Firpo et al., 2011). Autor et al. (2013b) show that
predominantly routine-intensive jobs are subject to offshoring. Hogrefe (2013) finds that
German manufacturing industries reduce domestic demand for routine and non-interactive
tasks in response to increased offshoring.
According to trade-induced technological and organisational change, I expect firms that
react to the increased market potential of the Enlargement to dismiss low- and medium-
skilled workers and to hire higher-skilled workers. My hypothesis is that jobs for low-
and/or medium-skilled workers are to be removed (or moved abroad). For high-skilled
workers, additional jobs should be created. Technological change that is task-biased is
likely to shift the demand for specific age groups of workers. When older workers concen-
trate in routine jobs which are subject to offshoring, then the relative demand for older
workers decreases. This might be reflected by increased domestic job destruction for this
age group.
3.4 Age-biased technological change
Innovations require workers to adapt to new technologies. In this adaptation process, the
skills of older workers tend to lose relevance and drop in their relative value. Moreover,
older workers are discriminated with respect to training participation, so their relative
employment prospects diminish with technological innovations in the firm (Behaghel and
Greenan, 2010). In this way, innovations can be viewed as age-biased against older workers
(Behaghel et al., 2014; Beckmann, 2007).
Empirical studies show that innovations decrease employment of older workers (Hujer
and Radic, 2006, for Germany) and that new technologies in the firms favour younger
workers in hirings as compared to older workers, whereagainst organisational innovations
decrease separations for older workers stronger than for younger workers (Aubert et al.,
2006, for France). Bartel and Sicherman (1993) find that older workers retire sooner after
unexpected technology upgrading, but steady technological change increases the amount
of training, and therefore leads to delayed retirement and longer careers of older workers.
As older workers lack the required mobility and the flexibility to update their skills, the
demand might be passed on to younger workers, who additionally exhibit lower employ-
ment protection and wages (Blossfeld et al., 2005). They are equipped with up-to-date
skills and accept more flexible contracts than their older colleagues. The literature on
age-specifc differences in job and worker flows (e.g. Abowd et al., 2006, 2007) states that
younger workers have higher employment dynamics than older workers. Clark and Sum-
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mers (1981) find that cyclical fluctuations require more dynamics from younger than from
older workers. Gielen and van Ours (2006) show that Dutch firms cyclically adjust employ-
ment through hirings of younger workers and through separations of older workers. Job
creation for younger workers is more sensitive in response to cyclical fluctuations than for
older workers. Job destruction, however, does not respond differently across age groups.
The effects of age-biased technological and organisational change are likely to strengthen
the age-specific demand shift due to the Enlargement. Consequently, the demand would
be passed on to younger workers. For younger workers, the flexibility demand of the in-
creased market is expected to be reflected by higher volatility, i.e. more separations and
more accessions.
4 Data and descriptive facts
The econometric analysis is based on a German linked employer-employee panel data set,
the LIAB. It combines data from the IAB-Establishment Panel and the Employment Stat-
istics Register (see Alda et al., 2005). The IAB-Establishment Panel is based on an annual
survey, whose sampling frame encompasses all German establishments that employ at least
one employee paying social security contributions. New establishments are added to the
survey every year to incorporate births and to correct for panel mortality and exits in
order to preserve the panel’s representative character. From the establishment level data
I gain information on a number of establishment characteristics such as establishment
size, the workforce composition as well as collective bargaining coverage. The second data
source is the Employment Statistics Register, which is an administrative data set based
on reports from employers in compliance with the notifying procedure for the German
social security system. The establishment data can be merged with the individual data
using a unique establishment identifier. This procedure obliges employers to provide a
notification at the beginning and the end of each employment relationship for all em-
ployees who are covered by the German social security system. The notifications provide
individual information on age, gender, nationality, employment status (blue-/white-collar,
part-/fulltime, apprenticeship), educational status, tenure and the gross daily wage. Since
there is an upper contribution limit to the social security system, gross daily wages are
top-coded. Following Gartner (2005), right-censored observations are replaced by imputed
wages. The latter are randomly drawn from a truncated normal distribution whose mo-
ments are constructed by the predicted values from Tobit regressions and whose (lower)
truncation point is given by the contribution limit to the social security system.
I use the panel waves from 1995 to 2009. The data set allows me to merge the selected
establishment data with notifications for all workers that are employed at June 30th of
each year. Each establishment in my sample is required to be observed during the years
2003, 2004 and 2005, i.e. around the date of the Enlargement.5
5I define the year 2004 to be after the Enlargement. The data are collected in June 2004, which is one
month after the date of the Enlargement.
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Measurement of employment changes is based on worker flow rates and on job flow
rates at the establishment-year-level. I define worker accessions WA and separations WS









Ajt is the number of accessions, Sjt the number of separations, and Ejt the stock of
employment at establishment j in year t. ∆Ejt takes first differences and represents the
annual employment growth. In a similar manner, I calculate job creation JC and job










for all ∆Ejt < 0. Overall, it holds that
∆Ejt = JCjt − JDjt = WAjt −WSjt (5)
When I calculate age and skill specific effects, I define age and skill groups in the
following way. Workers are considered high-skilled when they hold a college or university
degree. They are medium-skilled when they have completed vocational training. Low-
skilled are those workers who did not complete vocational training, irrespective of their
school degree. Concerning the age groups, I define young workers to be up to 29 years
old, prime-age between 30 and 49, and old workers over 50 years.
Table 1 describes the data set at the level of the establishment in averages over 1995
to 2009. In the manufacturing sector, establishments employ 258 workers on average. The
yearly worker accession rate is 8 per cent, and the worker separation rate is 8 per cent
as well. Job creation and job destruction per year amount to 5 per cent, respectively.
Detailed information on the outcome variables in the age and skill groups is contained in
Table 5 in the Appendix.
The workers’ average age is 42 years: 14 per cent of the workforce is younger than 30,
and 25 per cent is older than 50. 11 per cent do not have completed vocational training and
are considered low-skilled. The majority of 81 per cent is medium-skilled with completed
vocational training, and 8 per cent are high-skilled with a university degree or a degree
from a technical college. On average, workers earn 76 Euro per day, 24 per cent are female,
and 4 per cent do not have German nationality.
The average sales per worker of an establishment is about 160,000 Euro. Establish-
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics at the establishment level
mean std. dev.
Number of employees in establishment 258.35 970.39
Accession rate 0.08 0.12
Separation rate 0.08 0.14
Job creation rate 0.05 0.11
Job destruction rate 0.05 0.13
Age in years 42.16 3.88
Younger than 29 0.14 0.34
Prime-age 0.61 0.49
Older than 50 0.25 0.43
Without completed vocational training 0.11 0.31
Completed vocational training 0.81 0.39
University or technical college degree 0.08 0.28
Sales per worker in million Euro 0.16 0.37
Export share 19.36 24.60
Export share to Eastern Europe 2.19 4.60
Daily wage in Euro 75.83 1.41
Female workers 0.24 0.22
Foreign workers 0.04 0.08
White-collar workers 0.31 0.23
Works council 0.50 0.48
Number of establishments 1,370
Number of observations 11,345
ments export 19 per cent of their goods, and 2 per cent are exported to Eastern European
countries. 50 per cent of the establishments have a works council.
5 Empirical analysis
In Section 5.1, the effect of the Eastern Enlargement on changes in the number of workers,
worker flows, and job flows on the establishment level is estimated, and Section 5.2 works
out the effect heterogeneity across skill and age groups.
5.1 The effect of the Enlargement on employment changes
Using the 2004 European Union Eastern Enlargement as a source of exogenous variation
in trade liberalisation, I estimate the effect of trade liberalisation on establishment-level
employment changes. In a trend-adjusted difference-in-differences approach (DiDiD; com-
pare Blundell and Costa Dias, 2009), I compare outcomes across establishments that are
differentially exposed to international trade. Besides the variation over the periods be-
fore and after the Enlargement, I use a productivity term to differentiate firms by how
strong they are affected, and allow for trend adjustment in the before- and after-period,
respectively.
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The approach to utilise firm productivity to approximate the intensity of a trade-
induced demand shock has been suggested by Verhoogen (2008). It is based on the seminal
Melitz (2003) model, where heterogeneous firms within one industry are in competition for
export shares. Productivity is strongly correlated with the export status of establishments.
Only the most productive firms can bear the cost to enter and survive in the export market.
An increase in trade openness induces the most productive firms to increase exports and
profits. Less productive firms are still able to export, but with decreasing profits. The
least productive firms—which operated only domestically—leave the market completely.
The model predicts that trade liberalisation reallocates export market shares towards the
more productive firms.6
Building on this framework, initial firm-level productivity is assumed to be a monoton-
ous representation of the trade-induced demand shock created by the Enlargement. This
translates into a treatment intensity term that is continuous in its exposure to product
demand. This approach has been taken up by Frías et al. (2009) to analyse the export
wage premia effects of the 1994 Mexican Peso devaluation. Based on this idea, I ex-
ploit the argument that the direction and magnitude of the trade-induced demand shock
of the Enlargement should be driven by initial differences in firm-level productivity. In
the following, I use this approach to estimate heterogeneous employment effects of the
Enlargement.
The challenge of this approach is to find a suitable proxy for establishment-level pro-
ductivity. For my empirical model, the treatment intensity term pij is specified by initial
establishment-level sales divided by the number of workers. Sales per worker are likely
to represent the efficiency structure of the establishment, and should be a good proxy for
productivity. This choice is supported by Verhoogen (2008) and is based on the considera-
tion that more productive firms are larger in the domestic as well as in the export market.
Frías et al. (2009) run a number of robustness checks and find that their results do not
depend on the choice of the productivity proxy.
For the period before the Enlargement (1995 to 2003), initial per-worker sales are
measured in the first year the establishment is observed. After the Enlargement (2004 to
2009), initial per-worker sales are measured in the calendar year 2004. By taking initial
values before and after the Enlargement, I account for productivity changes that may
occur due to the trade-induced demand shock. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the
productivity term in the periods before and after the Enlargement. The two distributions
are very similar. The mass of the distribution is around 25,000 to 175,000 Euro sales per
worker. The distribution is skewed to the right, with 99 per cent of firms having less than
500,000 Euro sales per worker.7
6Bernard et al. (1995) analyse U.S. firm panel data and find that manufacturing firms that start
exporting strongly increase employment in the short run. However, they find that employment decreases
in the long run, since the transition rate out of the exporting market is found to be twice as high as the
transition rate into the exporting market. In this way, the current export status does not seem to be a
meaningful predictor of long run wage and employment growth.
7The remaining 1 per cent of the distribution has values of up to 3.6 million Euro sales per worker.
Due to data protection legislation, I am not able to draw the distribution with less than 20 observations
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Figure 3: Distribution of sales per worker before and after the Enlargement
Source: LIAB 1995-2009. Note: Each bar represents classed values of productivity by +/- 0.025
million Euro. Due to data protection issues, classes with less than 20 observations are not observ-
able.
Figure 4 demonstrates the relation between the productivity term (i.e. sales per
worker) and the export share in the period before and after the Enlargement. High-
productivity firms with more than 0.1 million Euro above-average sales per worker clearly
increase their exports in the period after the Enlargement. These firms are expected to be
affected stronger by the product market opening than establishments with below-average
initial productivity.
First-differenced outcome variables ∆yj to assess employment effects are changes in
establishment-level employment (∆E), in worker accession and separation rates (∆WA
and ∆WS), as well as in job creation and job destruction rates (∆JC and ∆JD). To
demonstrate the relation between the productivity term and the outcome variables, Fig-
ure 5.1 shows a nonparametric regression of the employment change on sales per worker.
The outcome variable and initial per-worker sales are deviated from industry-year-region
averages in order to correct for differences inherent to industry- and region-specific pat-
terns as well as time effects. The deviated nonparametric regression should reflect the
same relationship between the outcome and productivity that I will investigate further
down with the linear regression model. The graph depicts the relation between annual
employment growth on the establishment level and initial per-worker sales. The dashed
grey line is the relation in the period before, the solid grey line after the Enlargement.
in one class.
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Figure 4: Nonparametric regression of export share on initial sales per worker
Note: Nonparametric estimations are based on locally weighted least-squares regressions. The
smoothing bandwidth is set to 0.8. Due to data protection issues, information on a class with
less than 20 observations is not available. Export share and sales per worker are deviated from
industry-year-region averages. Sales per worker are represented by initial values in the before and
after period, respectively.
Before the Enlargement, employment growth increases in establishments in the upper part
of the productivity distribution, and decreases in establishments with low productivity.
After the Enlargement, this relation changes in the upper part of the productivity dis-
tribution, where yearly employment growth is negative. As a result, the solid black line
depicts the difference between the after- and the before-relation of employment growth
and productivity. The difference in employment growth, which I interpret as the effect
of the Enlargement, is negatively related to productivity, i.e. high-productivity firms ex-
perience negative employment growth, whereas low-productivity firms experience positive
employment growth.
Figure 6 contains nonparametric regressions of worker flows and job flows on initial per-
worker sales. The upper panels show changes in the worker accession rate and the worker
separation rate in relation to productivity. Accession rates above the average productivity
slightly increase after the Enlargement, but remain close to zero. In establishments with
below-average productivity, accessions rather decrease. The worker separation rate in
establishments with above-average productivity increases considerably, with a positive
relation to more productive firms.
The lower panels in Figure 6 show the relation between changes in the job creation
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Figure 5: Nonparametric regressions of employment growth on initial sales per worker
Note: Nonparametric estimation based on locally weighted least-squares regressions. The smooth-
ing bandwidth is set to 0.8. Due to data protection issues, information on a class with less than
20 observations is not available. Employment change and sales per worker are deviated from
industry-year-region averages. Sales per worker are represented by initial values in the before and
after period, respectively.
and the job destruction rate to productivity. The picture is very similar to the worker
flow rates. The difference in job creation rates (solid black line) is almost zero; it is even
closer to zero than the worker accession rate. The difference in job destruction rates is
positively related to productivity. From the nonparametric graphical analysis, I infer a
negative relation between the Enlargement and overall employment growth, and a positive
relation between the Enlargement and worker accession and job destruction rates. There
is also a positive relation between the Enlargement and worker accession and job creation,
but only for firms with below-average productivity.
In the following, I turn to parametric linear regressions and estimate this equation on
the level of establishments:
∆yjt = α+ βpij + γsDs + δrDr + ujt, (6)
where Ds and Dr denote sector and region dummies. First-differenced outcomes ∆yj
and the productivity term pij are deviated from their year averages. The equation is
estimated separately for the period before (1995 to 2003) and after the Enlargement (2004
to 2009). Moreover, the estimator adjusts for potentially different time trends across the
pre- and post-periods (DiDiD; compare Blundell and Costa Dias, 2009).
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Figure 6: Nonparametric regressions of changes in worker flows and job flows on initial
sales per worker
∆ worker accession rate ∆ worker separation rate
∆ job creation rate ∆ job destruction rate
Note: Nonparametric estimations are based on locally weighted least-squares regressions. The
smoothing bandwidth is set to 0.8. Due to data protection issues, information on a class with less
than 20 observations is not available. All outcome variables and sales per worker are deviated from
industry-year-region averages. Sales per worker are represented by initial values in the before and
after period, respectively.
Table 2 presents estimates of employment outcomes on initial productivity before and
after the Enlargement, and the difference between these. Before the Enlargement, more
productive firms had a positive yearly employment growth (+7 workers for firms with
+1 million Euro per-worker sales). In the period after the Enlargement, the effect turns
negative (-8 workers). The Enlargement had a negative net effect on yearly employment
growth in high productivity firms: a firm with +1 million Euro per-worker sales has an
average yearly employment growth of -15 workers in consequence to the Enlargement.
This effect is highly significant. The effect size gives this net effect in standard deviation
units of the outcome variable. So, the Enlargement decreases employment growth by 0.26
standard deviations.
On average, the Enlargement increased the first-differenced worker accession rate by 2
percentage points, which is statistically insignificant. There is a significant positive effect
of 7 percentage points on the worker separation rate (0.37 standard deviations). For job
flows, the Enlargement increased the job creation rate by 1 percentage point; this effect
is insignificant. There is a highly significant positive effect of 6 percentage points on the
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Table 2: Effect of the Enlargement on employment outcomes
Before After Net effect Effect size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆E 7.007** -8.151*** -15.159*** -0.2591
(3.162) (2.760) (3.715)
∆WA -0.014 0.007 0.020 0.123
(0.014) (0.005) (0.015)
∆WS -0.057*** 0.013*** 0.070*** 0.370
(0.016) (0.005) (0.018)
∆JC -0.007 0.003 0.010 0.064
(0.013) (0.003) (0.014)
∆JD -0.050*** 0.009* 0.059*** 0.341
(0.012) (0.006) (0.015)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; clustered at the level of the establishment. Effect size
calculated as the difference in standard deviations of the outcome variable. ***p-value<0.01, **p-
value<0.05, *p-value<0.1.
job destruction rate (0.34 standard deviations). The difference between worker accessions
and separations is negative, so overall employment in response to the Enlargement is
decreasing. This finding is confirmed by the negative difference between job creation and
job destruction.
5.2 Age- and skill-specific employment effects
The aim of this section is to analyse the effect heterogeneity of the Eastern Enlargement on
employment outcomes. Based on the estimator described in Section 5.1, I investigate the
heterogeneity in the effect of the Enlargement over age and skill groups within establish-
ments. To be more specific, I show how the effect differs for high-skilled, medium-skilled
and low-skilled workers, and analyse the pattern for young, prime-age and old workers.
The estimations are run separately for age and skill groups g to identify the heterogeneous
effect of the Enlargement βg:
∆yjtg = αg + βgpijg + γsgDsg + δrgDrg + ujtg. (7)
Starting with heterogeneous effects of the Enlargement over skill groups, Table 3
presents skill-specific effects on employment growth, worker flows, and job flows. Column
(1) in the table shows the net effects of the productivity term before and after the Enlarge-
ment; that is the effect of the Enlargement within the specific skill group. Note that the
outcome variables have different distributions over the skill groups. Therefore, Column
(2) presents the normalised size of the effect, that is the net effect of the Enlargement
relative to the standard deviation of the outcome variable. This normalisation allows me
to compare the specific effects over the different skill groups. Column (3) obtains the dif-
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ferences between the effect size of the low-skilled or the high-skilled group and the effect
size in the medium-skilled group.
An additional +1 million Euro sales per worker significantly reduces the yearly employ-
ment growth among medium- and high-skilled workers in consequence of the Enlargement
by 10 and 2.5 workers, which are 0.22 and 0.19 standard deviations, and insignificantly
by 2.4 workers or 0.07 standard deviations among low-skilled workers. For low-skilled
workers, the decline in employment growth is with 0.15 standard deviations significantly
smaller than the effect for medium-skilled workers.
Table 3: Skill-specific employment effects
(1) (2) (3)
Net effect Effect size Diff.from med
∆E




high -2.466*** -0.189 0.027
(0.912) (0.079)
∆WA




high -0.001 -0.006 -0.196
(0.023) (0.139)
∆WS




high -0.007 -0.032 -0.407***
(0.022) (0.127)
∆JC




high 0.008 0.038 -0.074
(0.022) (0.136)
∆JD




high 0.002 0.011 -0.315***
(0.016) (0.107)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; clustered at the level of the establishment. Effect size in
column (2) calculated as the difference in standard deviations of the outcome variable. ***p-
value<0.01, **p-value<0.05, *p-value<0.1.
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Turning to changes in worker flows, accession growth increases significantly among
medium-skilled workers by 0.19 standard deviations. The negative effect on worker ac-
cessions for low-skilled workers is significantly lower than the effect for medium-skilled
workers. For high-skilled workers, the effect is -0.01 standard deviations and insigni-
ficant. On worker separation growth, the effect is positive and significant for low- and
medium-skilled workers with a 0.23 and 0.38 standard deviations increase, respectively.
For high-skilled workers, the effect is close to zero and insignificant, but has a negative
sign. It is significantly different from the effect for medium-skilled workers.
Changes in job flows are affected in a similar way. The Enlargement reduces job cre-
ation growth of the low-skilled by 0.25 standard deviations. Although this estimate is
not significant, it is significantly lower than the effect on medium-skilled workers. Effects
for medium- and high-skilled workers are positive but insignificant. Regarding job de-
struction growth, the effects have a positive sign for all skill groups, and are significant
for low-skilled (0.17 standard deviations) and medium-skilled workers (0.33 standard devi-
ations). The effect on job destruction for high-skilled workers is almost 0 and insignificant,
and significantly larger than the effect for medium-skilled workers.
These estimates indicate that the negative employment effect of the Enlargement is
more severe for low- and medium-skilled workers, at it increases their separation rates and
job destruction, while high-skilled workers are not affected. This can be interpreted as a
sjukk bias in the effect of the Enlargement that is directed against low- and medium-skilled
workers.
Table 4 presents the age-specific effects of the Enlargement on growth of employment,
job flows, and worker flows. The effect of sales per worker on employment growth in
consequence of the Enlargement is negative for all age groups, where the overall effect is
driven by prime-age workers. For the prime-age and old workers, the effects are statistically
significant with a magnitude of -0.25 and -0.19 standard deviations.
There is no significant effect on the change in worker accessions in any age group. On
separations, the significant effects are 0.40 standard deviations for young workers, and
0.24 standard deviations for prime-age workers. The effect for older workers is also quite
large with 0.17 standard deviations, but insignificant.
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Table 4: Age-specific employment effects
(1) (2) (3)
Net effect Effect size Diff.from prime
∆E




old -4.637*** -0.191 0.060
(1.644) (0.117)
∆WA




old 0.012 0.052 0.016
(0.025) (0.134)
∆WS




old 0.039 0.174 -0.067
(0.026) (0.129)
∆JC




old 0.022 0.102 0.088
(0.026) (0.152)
∆JD




old 0.049*** 0.265 0.029
(0.018) (0.118)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; clustered at the level of the establishment. Effect size in
column (3) calculated as the difference in standard deviations of the outcome variable. ***p-
value<0.01, **p-value<0.05, *p-value<0.1.
The estimates on job flows mirror the estimates on worker flows. Job creation growth
is not significantly affected in all age groups. Effects on job destruction growth are there-
against highly significant in all age groups. The Enlargement increases job destruction
by 0.44 standard deviations for young workers, and by 0.24 and 0.27 standard deviations
for prime-age and old workers, respectively. The effect for young workers is significantly
larger than the effect for prime-age workers.
The age-specific employment effects of the Enlargement indicate decreased employment
growth among prime-age and older workers, but increased separations and job destruction
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among young and prime-age workers. These numbers do not suggest a clear age bias in
the effect of the Enlargement.
5.3 Robustness checks
The evidence from the nonparametric regressions in Figure 6 suggests that the slope of the
relation between some outcome variables and initial productivity changes at the origin.
In the following estimations, I allow the effect of pij to change at 0, i.e. I estimate the
relation:
∆yjt = α+ β−pi−j + β+pi+j + γsDs + δrDr + ujt, (8)
where pi−j = I(pi < 0) · pij and pi+j = I(pi > 0) · pij . The estimation results are shown
in Table 6 in the Appendix to this Chapter, where I further test whether β− = β+, i.e.
whether the specification in Equation 6 is justified. The coefficients and their statistical
significance indicate that the employment growth effects are driven by establishments
with above-average levels of initial per-worker sales (pi+), although β+ and β− are not
significantly different from each other. Effects on worker accession rates tend to be larger
for below-average performing establishments, where some coefficients turn significant. The
negative effect on worker separations is driven by below-average performing establishments
in the before-period, and by above-average performing establishments in the after-period.
The net effect is stronger for below-average establishments, which is significantly larger
than the above-average effect at a 10 per cent level. Concerning job creation rates, none of
the effects are statistically significant, although coefficients for below-average performing
establishments are larger than coefficients for above-average performing establishments. In
the period before the Enlargement, the effect on job destruction is much stronger for below-
average performing establishments. In the period after the Enlargement, the signs change
between both groups, and in the difference between both periods, the effect is stronger
for below-average performing establishments. However, considering the net effects of both
periods, β− and β+ are not significantly different. I conclude that in the periods before
and after the Enlargement, some of the effects differ between establishments with below-
or above-average values of initial sales per worker. But the differences between the net
effects for positive and negative deviations (Column 3) are statistically negligible. The
specification in Equation 6 seems justified.
In addition, one might be concerned about the measurement of sales. For the baseline
estimates in Table 2, I use sales in the year the establishment is first observed in the
panel data set. However, there might be cyclical variation in sales’ initial values over the
before period from 1995 to 2003. The starting value for the after period in 2004 might
be an exceptionally high or low value as compared to the years after. To test whether
the choice of initial values influences my empirical analysis, I alter the sampling of sales.
So, I refrain from taking initial values and instead average yearly sales over the before-
period and over the after-period, respectively. The results of the estimations based on
24
this averaged version of sales per worker can be found in Table 7 in the Appendix. The
effect on employment growth per establishment is smaller, but still significant. The effect
on worker accessions remains with the same sign and insignificant. But for job creation,
the estimate turns negative, though still insignificant. For worker separations and job
destruction, the direction, magnitude and significance of the effects do not change at all.
My estimates do not seem to be driven by the choice of the initial values of sales per
worker.
To test the robustness of my estimates with respect to the choice of the productivity
proxy, the estimations are also run with different productivity proxy variables. Table 8
in the Appendix runs the regression in Equation 6 with value added as a productivity
proxy. This robustness check is inspired by Müller (2012), who argues that value added
might represent an establishment’s economic performance in a more appropriate way than
sales due to different structures of intermediate inputs in the production process. The
estimates confirm the overall picture that the effect on employment growth is negative
(though insignificant in this specification), and on worker separations and job destruction
positive (and significant). However, using value added, the positive effect on changes in
worker accessions turns positive, though on a 10 per cent level only. Again, value added
seems to be a relevant proxy for productivity, but not exactly in the same way as sales.
The next productivity proxies are inspired by Frías et al. (2009) and use binary indic-
ator variables whether the establishments export and whether the establishments export
to Eastern Europe.8 The estimates of the robustness regressions are shown in Tables 9
and 10 in the Appendix to this chapter. The effects on employment growth in Column
(3) are smaller and insignificant with the export dummy or the dummy for exports to
Eastern Europe as productivity indicators. The effects on changes in worker separation
and job destruction have the same sign and are significant as well, though with a smaller
magnitude than the regressions with sales per worker. Different to sales per worker, the
effect on job creation turns negative (but remains insignificant). The effects on job de-
struction become smaller, but remain significant. Overall, the export indicators seem to
differentiate firms with regard to their underlying productivity in a similar way as sales
per worker do. However, the effects become smaller in their magnitude and employment
growth even becomes insignificant. In my empirical model, exports do not seem to be a
perfect substitute for sales to proxy the underlying productivity distribution.9
Moreover, I perform a robustness check to analyse the presence of an anticipation ef-
fect. As the Enlargement has been announced already in December 2002, it may be that
8“Eastern Europe” is not defined by the survey, i.e. I do not know which destination countries the
establishment considers to belong to “Eastern Europe”. Moreover, as exports to Eastern Europe have not
been surveyed before 2003, the starting values for the before-period are taken from the year 2003.
9I shortly summarise the results of the robustness check on the sensitivity of the choice of the productiv-
ity proxy. For skill-specific effects, all effects that are significant with sales per worker keep their sign when
switching to the export indicators. There is, however, one exception: The effect on worker accessions for
the low-skilled, which is significantly negative in my main specification, changes to insignificant positive
when switching to the export indicators. For age-specific effects, all statistically significant coefficients
have the same sign when I switch to the export dummy or the export dummy for Eastern Europe as
productivity proxies.
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German firms have adjusted employment prior to the actual accession. Therefore, I es-
timate Equation 6 with altered before and after periods. The period before the expected
anticipation is set to 1995 to 2002, where the period after the anticipation is set to 2003
to 2009. The anticipation effect on employment growth is negative, but insignificant (see
Table 11). The effects on worker accessions and job creation are negative, but insignific-
ant. For worker separations and job destruction, the effects are significantly positive, but
smaller than the actual effects of the Enlargement. This permits the interpretation that an
anticipation effect is present and would imply that establishments have already increased
separations and job destruction in anticipation of the Enlargement. In consequence, the
effects in Table 2 are likely to underestimate the overall effect of the Enlargement.
6 Conclusion
The aim of this analysis is to provide evidence on a potential age and a skill bias in the
employment effect of trade liberalisation. I focused on the 2004 EU Eastern Enlargement
to estimate the effect of the actual opening of the borders between the new member
countries and Germany. I used information on the development of manufacturing firms
in the periods before and after the Enlargement, and constructed a productivity variable
to approximate the intensity of the market opening. With a DiDiD estimator, I found a
negative effect of the Enlargement on employment growth, which is channelled by increased
worker separation and increased job destruction. This result is in contrast to the study
by Braakmann and Vogel (2011), who find no employment effects, and to Brülhart et al.
(2012), who find positive employment effects. These studies, however, estimate the effect
of the Enlargement for regions that are located close to the opening border in comparison
to regions that are farther from it. The result stands also in contrast to the study by
Dauth et al. (2014), who estimate the effect of increased trade with Eastern Europe and
China on regional manufacturing employment growth and find negative effects for regions
with increased import exposure, and positive effects for regions with increased export
exposure. My estimates are, on the contrary, based on variation over establishment-
level productivity, and indicate that more productive firms—that are more involved in
exporting—have reduced employment growth in reaction to the Enlargement.
Based on this estimator, I separately estimated the employment effects of the Enlarge-
ment in three skill groups and in three age groups. I found that employment growth
dropped in all skill groups. Low- and medium-skilled workers suffered increased separa-
tions and increased job destruction, and the effects are stronger for low-skilled workers.
Moreover, the low-skilled have significantly reduced accessions as compared to medium-
skilled workers. I find no effects on worker flows and job flows for the high-skilled. These
findings give rise to a skill bias in the employment effect of the Enlargement that is dir-
ected against low- and medium-skilled workers. The increase in separations is likely to
reflect skill upgrading, while the increased job destruction among low-and medium-skilled
workers is more in favour of the hypothesis of offshoring. The bias can be explained by the
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fact that the CEEC are relatively low- and medium-skill abundant and exhibit lower wage
levels. Thus, it seems that after the Enlargement they attracted offshoring in the low- and
medium-skill segment. The skill-specific results contradict Braakmann and Vogel (2011),
who do not find a differential effect on the share of low-skilled workers in establishments.
They do not consider effects on the shares of medium- or high-skilled workers.
The employment growth effect of the Enlargement is negative for prime-age and older
workers. Both groups experienced increased job destruction, and so did the young workers.
Separations have significantly increased for young and prime-age workers only. I found
no significant effects on worker accessions, although the coefficient has a negative sign
for young and a positive sign for old workers, and is close to zero for prime-age workers.
These results do not indicate a clear age bias. While employment drops strongest for
prime-age and older workers, younger workers experienced high worker separation and job
destruction. These estimates are not in line with my hypothesis that the trade-induced
technological change favours younger over older workers. In consequence to the 2004
Eastern Enlargement to the European Union, these results to not confirm an age bias in
the employment effects of the trade-induced demand shock.
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7 Appendix
Figure 7: Age mix of the workforces in Germany and the CEEC
Source: Eurostat; own computations.
Figure 8: Skill mix of the workforces in Germany and the CEEC
Source: Eurostat; own computations.
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Table 5: Outcome variables in averages over 1995 to 2009
outcome group level std. dev. first diff. std. dev.
number of workers
overall 258.3512 970.3922 -2.1756 58.5161
low 63.8464 188.5017 -2.8433 35.3754
med 186.6717 693.6061 -0.9880 46.1703
high 51.9598 214.2104 0.8496 13.0657
young 39.6344 141.8807 -1.5198 17.8297
prime 167.5864 638.7125 -2.3027 36.0185
old 69.5821 235.8700 1.47662 24.2785
worker accession rate
overall 0.0847 0.1237 -0.0060 0.1634
low 0.0657 0.1530 -0.0082 0.3407
med 0.0859 0.1302 -0.0060 0.1713
high 0.0963 0.1632 -0.0055 0.2196
young 0.2175 0.2458 -0.0118 0.3407
prime 0.0977 0.1370 -0.0083 0.1830
old 0.1523 0.1679 -0.0066 0.2296
worker separation rate
overall 0.0841 0.1423 0.0169 0.1881
low 0.0892 0.1721 0.0158 0.2397
med 0.0819 0.1425 0.0168 0.1921
high 0.0751 0.1524 0.0145 0.2114
young 0.2282 0.2425 0.0157 0.3362
prime 0.1121 0.1503 0.0154 0.2015
old 0.1035 0.1627 0.0203 0.2230
job creation rate
overall 0.0477 0.1115 -0.0111 0.1481
low 0.0424 0.1368 -0.0100 0.2833
med 0.0505 0.1176 -0.0108 0.1604
high 0.0645 0.1483 -0.0099 0.1978
young 0.1010 0.2051 -0.0127 0.2833
prime 0.0472 0.1205 -0.0111 0.1604
old 0.0931 0.1595 -0.0167 0.2117
job destruction rate
overall 0.0471 0.1315 0.0118 0.1729
low 0.0659 0.1595 0.0140 0.2235
med 0.0464 0.1300 0.0119 0.1747
high 0.0433 0.1338 0.0101 0.1842
young 0.1116 0.2108 0.0148 0.2823
prime 0.0616 0.1396 0.0126 0.1871
old 0.0442 0.1339 0.0103 0.1828
Note: The average numbers of workers in the skill and age groups do not add up to the overall
number of workers, as workers can change their skill level or age into the next age group.
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Table 6: Effect of the Enlargement on employment outcomes for establishments with
below- and above-average initial per-worker sales
Outcome Explanatory Before After Net effect
variable variable (1) (2) (3)
∆E
pi+ 7.975** -8.795*** -16.771***
(4.056) (2.848) (4.439)
pi− -5.828 -0.733 5.095
(17.269) (24.968) (29.744)
Difference 13.804 -8.062 -21.866
(18.886) (26.255) (31.657)
∆WA
pi+ -0.001 0.023 0.004
(0.013) (0.023) (0.014)
pi− -0.051 0.051** 0.102*
(0.047) (0.023) (0.059)
Difference 0.050 -0.048** -0.098
(0.051) (0.023) (0.062)
∆WS
pi+ -0.022 0.015*** 0.037**
(0.015) (0.004) (0.015)
pi− -0.165*** -0.010 0.155***
(0.047) (0.023) (0.058)
Difference 0.143*** 0.025 0.118*
(0.050) (0.023) (0.060)
∆JC
pi+ -0.005 0.000 0.006
(0.013) (0.002) (0.013)
pi− -0.011 0.032 0.043
(0.044) (0.020) (0.054)
Difference 0.005 -0.032 -0.038
(0.048) (0.021) (0.058)
∆JD
pi+ -0.026** 0.013*** 0.038***
(0.011) (0.004) (0.012)
pi− -0.124*** -0.029 0.096*
(0.037) (0.023) (0.050)
Difference 0.099** 0.041* -0.058
(0.040) (0.023) (0.051)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; clustered at the level of the establishment. ***p-value<0.01,
**p-value<0.05, *p-value<0.1.
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Table 7: Robustness check: Sales per worker averaged in periods before and after the
Enlargement
Before After Net effect Effect size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆E 4.274* -6.308 -10.582** -0.181
(2.455) (3.954) (4.464)
∆WA 0.001 0.008 0.006 0.039
(0.011) (0.005) (0.013)
∆WS -0.056*** 0.010** 0.067*** 0.355
(0.012) (0.005) (0.014)
∆JC 0.014 0.004 -0.010 -0.065
(0.010) (0.004) (0.011)
∆JD -0.044*** 0.007 0.051*** 0.294
(0.009) (0.006) (0.012)
Note: All outcome variables are first-differenced. Standard errors in parentheses; clustered at the
level of the establishment. Effect size calculated as the difference in standard deviations of the
outcome variable.
Table 8: Robustness check: Value added as treatment intensity
Before After Net effect Effect size
∆E -4.752 -9.513 -9.513 -0.163
(17.344) (12.736) (21.479)
∆WA -0.035 0.026* 0.061* 0.374
(0.028) (0.014) (0.034)
∆WS -0.111*** 0.011 0.122*** 0.647
(0.028) (0.022) (0.040)
∆JC -0.015 0.017 0.031 0.211
(0.027) (0.014) (0.033)
∆JD -0.091*** 0.001 0.092** 0.531
(0.025) (0.021) (0.037)
Note: All outcome variables are first-differenced. Standard errors in parentheses; clustered at the
level of the establishment. Effect size calculated as the difference in standard deviations of the
outcome variable.
36
Table 9: Robustness check: Export indicator as treatment intensity
Before After Net effect Effect size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆E 1.700 -1.556 -3.256 -0.0556
(1.811) (1.417) (2.250)
∆WA 0.001 0.005** 0.005 0.027
(0.005) (0.003) (0.006)
∆WS -0.023*** 0.004 0.027*** 0.141
(0.005) (0.003) (0.007)
∆JC 0.009* 0.004* -0.005 -0.032
(0.005) (0.002) (0.006)
∆JD -0.015*** 0.0014 0.016*** 0.094
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006)
Note: All outcome variables are first-differenced. Standard errors in parentheses; clustered at the
level of the establishment. Effect size calculated as the difference in standard deviations of the
outcome variable.
Table 10: Robustness check: Export indicator Eastern Europe as treatment intensity
Before After Difference Effect size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆E 1.791 -3.214 -5.004 -0.086
(2.261) (2.411) (3.335)
∆WA -0.002 0.003 0.005 0.028
(0.005) (0.002) (0.006)
∆WS -0.017*** 0.004 0.021*** 0.111
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
∆JC 0.004 0.002 -0.002 -0.013
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005)
∆JD -0.012*** 0.003 0.014** 0.083
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Note: All outcome variables are first-differenced. Standard errors in parentheses; clustered at the
level of the establishment. Effect size calculated as the difference in standard deviations of the
outcome variable.
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Table 11: Robustness check: Anticipation effects one year prior to the Enlargement
Before After Net effect Effect size
∆E 9.679 -3.731** -13.410 -0.229
(9.771) (1.626) (9.877)
∆WA 0.020 0.003 -0.016 -0.098
(0.017) (0.003) (0.017)
∆WS -0.030* 0.011 0.041** 0.218
(0.015) (0.008) (0.018)
∆JC 0.026 0.003 -0.024 -0.162
(0.018) (0.002) (0.018)
∆JD -0.024* 0.010 0.033** 0.191
(0.013) (0.008) (0.016)
Note: All outcome variables are first-differenced. Standard errors in parentheses; clustered at the
level of the establishment. Effect size calculated as the difference in standard deviations of the
outcome variable.
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